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Abstract 
The events that took place since 2007 raised new challenges to the economy. The traditional 
approaches to the corporate governance and to the private property are reshaped. The interests of the 
society and of the national economy win the upper hand against the interests of the company. The 
participants and the instruments of the corporate governance are surrounded by a new reality. 
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„The rise of the modern corporation led to a 
concentration of economic power that is 
comparable with the power of the modern state.“  
A. Berle and G. Means, „The modern corporation 
and private property” (1932) 
 
Introduction 
 
The events of 2007 posed new challenges to the global economy. Proven models and 
management practices have been criticized. Existing concepts and theories about the role of 
the market and the state are subject to revision. Private-law relations „shareholder-manager“ 
reviewed as the model „principal-agent“ placed in the new institutional framework defined by 
international organizations. The interests of society take precedence over corporate interests. 
In this situation, practice turning to theory. The importance of economic development 
for society addressing development of a model to meet the expectations of economic agents 
and stakeholders. In a similar situation in the 1930s, the theory offers a model based on 
research by A. Berle and G. Means [Berle, A., G. Means. 1932].  
In the economic history the mankind succeeds to overcome a series of shocks, the most 
significant of which is the Great Depression. Regardless of the time lag between the 
depression of the 1930s and the recession of the early twenty-first century, there are some 
similarities. In both turning point, deregulation leads to dominance of corporate interests over 
the public, followed by government intervention in the private-law relationship between 
shareholders and managers. 
 
The monumental work by A. Berle and G. Means „Modern Corporation and Private 
Property“ is often cited and little rereads [Weidenbaum, M., M. Jensen. 2009: viii]. As an 
object of study, they analyzed the effectiveness of using the state subsidies granted by the US 
government to deal with the effects of the economic depression. After summarizing the data 
of 200 leading US public companies from the real sector, was established the managers use 
funds for projects which are not in the interest of shareholders. In conclusion, the authors 
defined that the reason for the inefficient management the fact that the possibility of a 
decision making is passed by the shareholders to managers. As a consequence, the control 
over the company separated from ownership. In the spirit of Keynesianism, A. Berle and G. 
Means introduce requirements for state control over the actions of managers. 
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 Eighty years after the work of A. Berle and G. Means can be noted some similarities in 
economic development. The world economy is in recession, caused by practices in corporate 
governance, lack of effective control over the actions of managers and passive participation 
by shareholders [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2009: 13]. Risk 
appetite has led to excess profits and the need for state intervention to protect the interests of 
society. State aid to tackle the crisis provided to the private sector in the form of temporarily 
acquired shares are used inefficiently by the managers of companies.  
 
In the era of A. Berle and G. Means participants in corporate governance are limited to 
two: shareholders and managers. Shareholders in their capacity as owners of the company 
delegated management of managers.  
Shareholders, in the words of A. Berle and G. Means, are characterized by „rational 
apathy“ due to dispersion of ownership. Before the Great Depression, in the United States 
were adopted legislative initiatives aimed at a wider diffusion of ownership. Antitrust laws 
preclude the formation of cross-ownership between companies. With the introduction of a 
prohibition commercial banks to hold shares in companies and imposing of financial 
sanctions on mutual funds that invest more than 5% of their portfolio in one company, created 
an environment to increase the number of minority shareholders. Ownership in industries 
passed into public companies and the management of directors - to professional managers. 
Government policy on deregulation led to separation of ownership from control in addition to 
the existing separation of management from ownership. Resulted „corporate revolution“ due 
to the dispersion of shareholders property is compared by A. Berle and G. Means with the 
change of land ownership after the French Revolution. 
With the acquisition of a share of a public company the shareholder retained ownership 
of the stock and conceded the management to managers. While shareholder has statutory 
restriction to change managers and gradually become passive investor. The participation of 
shareholders narrowed to trading of their legal status for private property with the role of 
recipient of return [Weidenbaum, M., M. Jensen. 2009: viii]. Shareholders were similar with 
renters - anonymous participants with a small share in the capital [Bratton, W. 2001: 737]. 
The benefit for shareholders by purchasing shares was reduced to receiving „salary in the 
capital”. 
Along with the effective separation between management and ownership is increased as 
the size of the company and the concentration in the economy. Shareholders retained a degree 
of control by their right to authorize to vote and the right to veto in case of acquisition. On the 
economic scene comes a new factor on corporate governance - the market for corporate 
control.  
 
Managers, according A. Berle and G. Means, took control over the company due to the 
dispersion of ownership. To the traditional activity for management is added new one - setting 
of the company policy. In this situation, called „managerism“, the right of shareholders for 
control is transformed by the power of managers to select projects for the development of the 
company. The economic power is concentrated in a new class of professional managers 
[Mizruchi, M. 2004: 579]. The behavior of managers do not affects by the view of 
shareholders, public expectations and the requirements of the state.  
At the beginning of the Great Depression, the leading 200 companies controlled 49.2 
percent of corporate wealth [Davis, G. 2011: 1207]. A. Berle and G. Means indicated that if 
the trend be maintained, these companies will become „the dominant institutions of the 
modern world“. The private ownership of shareholders became „economic empires“ that are 
„in the hands of a new form of absolutism on ownership“. Companies already looked like a 
classic entrepreneur in the face of the managers who ran against salary.  
 The separation of ownership from control removes the instruments of shareholders to 
monitor the actions of managers. With the new power the managers expected pursue their 
goals using capital of shareholders. Managers' interests began to diverge with those of 
shareholders. The separation of ownership from control created „quasi-public companies“.  
 
Writing „Modern Corporation and Private Property“ reflects three trends in economic 
development: increasing of concentration; increase the dispersion of share ownership; 
separation of control from ownership [Means, G. 2009: xlix]. The modern corporation from 
1930s is a dominant factor in the national economy and private property - dispersed.  
The modern corporation since the beginning of the XXI century is dominant in the 
global economy, over which national governments have less control [Genovese, E. 1997: 
202]. The interests of shareholders and managers coincided in the field of bulls’ market and 
turned to short-term results [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
2009: 43]. The need for government intervention in private property was dictated by the 
interests of society and financial stability. Private ownership is dispersed with a majority 
shareholder in the face of state. 
 
Given the characteristics of corporate governance will apply theory „principal-agent“ by 
the approach SMART (Shareholders, Managers, Auditors, Regulators, Tools) [Nedelchev, M. 
2004: 7]. We will attempt to look at the modern corporation and private property at the 
beginning of the XXI century. 
 
Shareholders participated passively in corporate governance. Protected by international 
principles and guaranteed by national laws, the shareholders delegated the decision making to 
the managers and focused on short-term dividends. Limited liability of shareholders for the 
obligations of the company led to excess risk taking by managers and violation of the public 
interest.  
For protection of financial stability and the interests of society, the state replaced 
shareholders in corporate governance. To tackle the economic recession companies were 
stabilized by government lending and government guarantees. Competent national authorities 
temporarily acquired a majority stake in the ownership of leading companies and started to 
serve control over managers. Between the state and shareholders arise new agency problem - 
between majority and minority shareholders opposed to the traditional agency problem in A. 
Berle and G. Means - between shareholders and managers [La Porta, R., F. Lopez–de–Silanes, 
A. Shleifer. 1999: 471]. The presence of different types of shareholders determines the trend 
in their actions for change the composition of managers to be reactive rather than proactive 
[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2009: 31]. 
The shareholders of the modern corporation should take responsibility for private 
property and incur financial losses. Their participation in corporate governance should be 
responsible according to the company's goals for creating value in the long term [International 
Corporate Governance Network. 2009: 19]. New regulatory requirements are forcing 
shareholders to be active in the management of the company by exercising the voting right. 
The control of shareholders was restored by regulatory requirements to adopt new policies for 
managers’ remuneration. 
 
Managers were financial encouraged to take excessive risk. The management of 
delegated property began to be used for purposes which damaged the financial stability and 
public interests. 
To deal with the effects of the economic recession the participation of managers in 
corporate governance was put on a qualitatively new level. The state, as a majority 
 shareholder after the financial intervention to stabilize the companies, gets the right to make 
changes in management, including establishment over half the number of managerial staff 
[European Commission. 2008: 8]. International organizations have set new principles for 
managers for increased responsibility on disclosure of financial results and the accompanying 
principles on corporate governance. The new dimensions for the participation of the managers 
in corporate governance include directors, independent of managers and the presence of 
significant attempt to control corporate management for the benefit of shareholders. To reduce 
the „risk appetite“ for managers introduced new international requirements and national 
policies for remuneration linked to long-term financial results. 
 
Auditors are involved in corporate governance because of the limited liability for 
shareholders and the need for control over managers [Fohlin, C. 2003: 17]. The main function 
of auditors is warning: providing of information on the financial results to shareholders and 
regulators [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2005: 22]. 
The role of auditors in reducing the information asymmetry was reduced because of the 
conflict of interest in the provision of services in auditing and advising. The interests of the 
auditors and internal stakeholders in corporate governance, shareholders and managers, 
coincided with reporting of increased financial results as the risk was outsourced outside the 
company - to bondholders and models of deposit insurance.  
After a series of bankruptcies in 2003 and international initiatives to tackle the economic 
recession from 2007, to the auditors were introduced requirements for a periodic rotation and 
mandatory tendering procedure in the selection of a new auditor. Audit companies were 
prohibited from providing their customers with services other than auditing, such as advising.  
The globalization of major audit companies lead to complexity of their structure and 
management that reduced the transparency of their actions. The concentration and expansion 
of audit companies imposes the need of regulators to be confident in the quality of audit 
[Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2008: 11]. The control function over audit 
companies was entrusted to public authorities for transparency of organizational structures 
and unbundling of the audit and advising.  
 
Regulators involved in corporate governance to avoid the mistakes of the market, thus 
creating public goods [Pigou, A. 1938: 4]. Expectations for the prudential supervision of the 
activities of the companies are not justified because the government policy to promote 
regional competitiveness.  
One of the main factors led to the economic recession is insufficient oversight of macro-
economic level [European Central Bank. 2010]. Applied policy „too big to fail“ creates moral 
hazard, which encouraged shareholders and managers to use riskily the assets of the company 
at the expense of society and government [Bebchuk, L., H. Spamann. 2009: 14]. 
Consequences of the economic recession were took mainly from taxpayers and large number 
of small and medium enterprises [European Parliament. 2010].  
For protection interests of society and economic stability, the state financially support 
leading companies as acquired in them property through buying shares. After acquisition of 
majoritarian part from ownership the state began to control shareholders, managers and 
auditors. The main goal, the state to correct the practices of the companies through the 
acquisition of shares, was not achieved. Financial injections from the state changed the 
competitiveness of certain companies. After the financial intervention of the state, the 
concentration of the market is increase as a number of large EU banks with assets larger than 
the gross domestic product of origin country increased from 10 to 15. 
Since 2007 state intervention in private property terminates model of liberalism [Beffa J. 
-L., X. Ragot. 2008: 457]. Since 2008, in the EU were introduced new requirements for 
 companies receiving assistance that limit shareholders to acquire new assets over the next 
three years, and managers to pay dividends after a certain period of time. European banking 
groups, received financial assistance, were restructured by the state through splitting them 
into small banks. In 2010, US law was passed Dodd-Frank Act which allows regulators to 
compartmentalize large financial institutions. Purpose of the law is profits and losses to be 
borne by each bank, and not of her customers. The meaning of the requirement is taxpayers' 
money that saved banks, to not use for speculation for enrichment of shareholders and 
managers.  
 
Tools in corporate governance include practices to remove the agent problem and reduce 
information asymmetry.  
In the modern corporation shareholders regained control over managers through policies 
on remuneration. International organizations have introduced new standards in determining 
the financial incentives of managers. Aim of the standards is tying of the variable part of the 
remuneration with term performance of managers. Policies of the companies on remuneration 
were applied after its approval by general meeting of shareholders. For protection interests of 
private property from opportunistically behavior of the managers was introduced a 
remuneration committee, composed of independent directors. 
For reduction of information asymmetry towards modern corporations were imposed 
varicose requirements for disclosure of information including financial and non-financial 
reports. The managers have an increased liability under disclosure of information about 
enclosed principles on corporate governance. The purpose of the requirements is to provide 
accurate and timely information on the results and the company's obligations to society, 
shareholders and potential investors. 
 
Conclusion 
The events of 2007 posed new challenges to global economy. Were introduced new 
policies and practices on corporate governance to protect the interests of society and the 
economic stability. 
Economic development at Great Depression of 1930s and eighty years later, at 
economic recession, have similarities, which are connected with shortcomings in corporate 
governance. Separation of control from ownership in both historical moments leads to taking 
of an excessive risk for high profits, which should borne by society and the economy. State 
intervention in corporate governance by providing funds is not effective because of abuses by 
managers. 
The modern corporation, after the financial intervention, is dependent by the state. 
Instead to regulate companies, the state they managed as majority shareholder. Globalization 
of activities of companies add to participation of the state and actions of international 
organizations when control over managers.  
Private property is dispersed with majority shareholder in the face of the state. The state 
performs dual role on controlling and managing private property. The conflict of interests in 
state participation additionally increases the agent problem between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
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